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Belief in a free market economy characterized by competition has long
been a touchstone of U.S. economic policy, both domestically and interna-
tionally. In the area of international telecommunications regulation, the
U.S. free market orientation is colliding with the planning approaches used
by most of the world's countries. In addition, developing countries are
interjecting a political aspect, based not upon traditions of different com-
munications systems and economic policies but upon concepts of national
sovereignty and sharing of the world's resources, both natural and eco-
nomic. This article will review these conflicting positions in the context of
satellite technology and use of the geostationary orbit.'
The article will first describe the structure of satellite regulation interna-
tionally and in the U.S. domestic market. It will identify the various uses of
satellite technology and its impact upon the individual, the perceived role of
U.S. domestic regulation in fostering technological development, and the
application of current U.S. regulation to international telecommunications.
The article will then review and analyze the issues and results of the recent
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tPart I of this two-part series on International Communications Law appeared at 19 INT'L
LAW. 1339 (1985) [Ed.].
1. The geostationary orbit is so described because satellites placed in orbit 22,300 miles
above the earth's equator travel at the same rate as the earth's rotation, making their orbit
geosynchronous. Therefore, they remain in the same position relative to the earth at all times.
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World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) in 1985 on the use of the
geostationary orbit, the so-called Space WARC,2 in the context of these
different policy and regulatory approaches.
At issue are different views of the world-based on a perceived maldis-
tribution of resources and favoring the use of planning to allocate re-
sources-another espousing technical progress, enterprise, pragmatic coop-
eration, and market forces. At stake is the optimum use of satellite com-
munication resources. The authors conclude that the planning procedures
being formulated by the WARC may be superceded by technological and
market forces and that the negotiations to determine the new allocation
system should guard against hampering the efficient use of the orbit/spec-
trum resource.
I. Spectrum Use and Regulation
International communications regulation primarily has been a question of
coordination among countries to avoid interference. As the Federal Com-
munications Commission's (FCC) predecessor was created in 1927 to coor-
dinate and manage the use of the radio spectrum in the U.S. to avoid
interference between signals and waste of a limited resource, 3 the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union's (ITU) predecessors were created to
coordinate communications between countries.4 With the development of
broadcast and advanced telephone communications, the ITU took on the
2. It is also referred to as WARC-ORB(l). WARC-ORB(2) is the implementation session
to be held in 1988.
3. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 45 Stat. 1559 (1929). The Federal Radio
Commission, created by this Act, was supplanted by the Federal Communications Commission
in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 etseq. (1962 & Supp. 1985). For the
history and development of communications regulation in the U.S., see 3 E. BARNOUW, A
HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1970); DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
BROADCASTING (F. Kahn 4th ed. 1984); and G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY:
THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (1982).
4. For a history of the ITU, see G. CODDING AND A. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 1-55 (1982) [hereinafter CODDING AND
RUTKOWSKI]. The ITU is now a United Nations agency. Its role has been to regulate the
technical and administrative functioning of telephone, telegraph, and broadcast systems as they
passed national boundaries. To this end, it allocates frequencies to avoid technical interference,
establishes methods of collecting accounts for international system use between countries and
standards for interconnection of facilities and networks and, more recently, has provided
technical and developmental assistance for new systems.
The basic decision-making body of the ITU is the Plenipotentiary Conference, composed of
all 160 signatories of the ITU's basic treaty, the International Telecommunications Conven-
tion. While it is traditional that decisions be made by consensus, when votes are taken the result
is based upon the majority of those present and voting. The decisions must be ratified by the
governments of the members to become effective. The Administrative Council is responsible
for administering all ITU functions between Plenipotentiaries. See id. at 59-192 (describing
ITU decision-making structure).
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international role of "traffic cop" to avoid interference and allocate fre-
quency uses among countries by regions.5 The appropriate agency within
each country (the FCC in the U.S.) allocates frequencies for domestic use
within the frequency and allocations agreed upon by the ITU.6 The ITU has
traditionally been a more technical body than the FCC; it does not have the
FCC's statutory mandate of regulating to make available a rapid, efficient,
nationwide and worldwide communications service. 7
A. SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES
Satellites are operated by various groups. In most parts of the world,
satellite system operators are government-related. In the U.S., with one
exception, commercial satellites are operated by the private sector. The
operator rarely uses all of the satellite system capacity itself and may use
none of it. Instead, the satellite capacity is made available to others for
transmission of differing types of communications.
1. Satellite System Operators
The geostationary orbital locations and associated frequencies are used
by three global satellite systems: INTELSAT (International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization), INMARSAT (International Marine
Satellite Organization) 8 and INTERSPUTNIK, 9 and several regional
systems.'() The majority of the satellites using the geostationary orbit are
5. Id. at 11-18. As discussed infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text, the radio spectrum
has numerous uses and is allocated among the different types of uses to avoid interferences of
one signal with another. Other spectrum uses not discussed in this article include public and
private land mobile communications services (traditional and cellular), aeronautical mobile
services, amateur radio services, and terrestrial microwave services. The regions are: Region I
(Europe. Africa and the USSR), Region 2 (Western Hemisphere). Region 3 (Asia, Australia
and Oceana), African Broadcasting Area. European Broadcasting Area. European Maritime
Area, and Tropical Zone. See id. at 255-81 (description and discussion of ITU frequency
management activities).
6. See, e.g.. 47 C.F.R. §§ 201-06 (1984) (international frequency allocations).
7. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1962 & Supp. 1985).
8. INMARSAT is an international cooperative similar to INTELSAT. INMARSAT pro-
vides maritime telecommunications and navigation services via satellite. Convention on the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT). 1978. reprinted in E. PLOMAN.
INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION: A COLLECTION OF BASIC
DOCUMENTS 295 (1982) [hereinafter PLOMAN].
9. The Soviet Union did not participate in INTELSAT. Instead, it initiated a similar system
in which the Warsaw Bloc countries participate using Soviet satellites. See Agreement on the
Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space
Communications, 1971. reprinted in PLOMAN. supra note 8, at 293. The USSR. however, has
recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with INTELSAT which, although
not providing for full USSR membership. does lay the ground rules for USSR use of the
INTELSAT system. Soviet Signs Pact with INTELSAT. Washington Post. Aug. 28, 1985. at
G; USSR a Step Closer to Joining INTELSAT, BROADCASTING, Sept. 2, 1985 at 62-63.
10. The European system (EUTELSAT) and Indonesian system (Palapa) are in operation,
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those of the numerous domestic satellite (DOMSAT) systems." Interna-
tional satellite traffic is exclusive to the two global systems while the regional
and domestic systems provide more limited geographical service.12
INTELSAT is an international cooperative in which 110 governments are
represented by virtue of an international treaty. 13 The U.S. took the lead in
establishing INTELSAT, and the U.S. representative, COMSAT (Com-
munications Satellite Corporation), 4 also continued to perform some ad-
ministrative functions of INTELSAT until 1979. " COMSAT received FCC
authorization to launch the first INTELSAT satellite, "Early Bird," in
1965.16
The FCC soon thereafter initiated a rulemaking proceeding to determine
if COMSAT had a monopoly on satellites and, in 1971, concluded that
authorization of domestic satellites owned by private companies also was
warranted.' 7 As the FCC has pointed out in its DOMSAT decisions, its
regulatory goals are to provide the best, most efficient services to the public
and to manage the use of the spectrum to avoid interference and, therefore,
waste of the spectrum resource. 18 To this end, the FCC has avoided as much
while systems are planned for the Arabic (ARABSAT) and Latin American (PANAMSAT)
countries. PANAMSAT differs from the other regional systems in being a private, non-
governmental system. See LIVE, Some Conflicting Trends in Satellite Telecommunications. in
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONs 73 (1984) (discussing ITU regulatory prob-
lems in context of trend towards multi-state systems); COURTEIX. EUTELSAT: EuropeIs
Satellite Telecommunications, id. at 85 (discussing EUTELSAT's origin, structure and rela-
tionship of EUTELSAT to INTELSAT).
11. The U.S. leads by far, with 50 DOMSATs in orbit or authorized. Canada launched the
first DOMSAT, Anik-l; France and India also maintain DOMSATs. China and Japan have
current plans to launch one or more DOMSATs.
12. Limited may be a misleading term. however. Atlantic Satellite, a private company, has
received preliminary governmental approval to launch the first Irish DOMSAT. It will have a
footprint-the geographical area within which a satellite's signals can be received-from
Europe to California. See Irish Satellite Project Could Compete with INTELSA T, Communica-
tions Daily Oct. 1, 1985 at 2.
13. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
"INTELSAT," 1971, reprinted in PLOMAN. supra note 8, at 287.
14. COMSAT is unique in being the only U.S. corporation. It was created by the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (as amended).
15. COMSAT Study. 77 F.C.C.2d 564. 592 (1980). In the COMSAT Study, pursuant to a
congressional mandate, the Commission reviewed the history of the U.S. space and satellite
programs and current regulatory stance as related to INTELSAT.
16. COMSAT Applications for Early Bird. 38 F.C.C. 1298 (1965).
17, Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) [DOMSA TI]. ol
recon., 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972).
18, Id at 91-94; Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844. 846-47
(1972) [DOMSATII], aff'd sub nom. Network Project v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Orbit Deployment Plan, 84 F.C.C.2d 584. 586-89 (1984).
The Commission's objectives in licensing domestic satellites have been summarized as follows:
"(a) to maximize the opportunities for the early acquisition of technical, operational. and
marketing data and experience in the use of this technology as a new communications resource
for all types of services; (b) to afford a reasonable opportunity for multiple entities to demon-
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as possible establishing regulations for the use of domestic satellites, believ-
ing that an open market and free competition would result in the best service
and most advanced technologies.' 9
2. Satellite Services
The Commission's "open entry" policy has been successful.2tt Satellite
technology has provided numerous services which the public now takes for
granted, perhaps without even realizing their source. Satellites have con-
tributed greatly to advances in weather prediction, minimizing damages
from hurricanes, floods, and other weather-related catastrophes by provid-
ing more advance warning. Other "remote sensing" satellites are used for
mineral, oil and geological exploration, in agriculture to identify crop dam-
age, irrigation requirements, and deforestation, to identify possible nuclear
waste disposal sites, and to study ocean currents and patterns.
Satellite broadcasting services have provided international transmissions
of video programming, made possible new video and audio networks, and
spurred the growth of cable and pay television.2' These services have
broadened programming options, introduced or increased video to rural
areas difficult to access by land lines, and created new industries and jobs.
The international broadcasting services have contributed to the develop-
ment of a "global village" concept, in which events and national disasters in
other countries are known around the world as soon as, and sometimes
before, they are known locally.
22
The FCC has authorized provision of a new satellite broadcast service:
Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) service.23 Advances in technology have
strate how any operational and economic characteristics peculiar to satellite technology can be
used to provide existing and new specialized services more economically and efficiently than
can be done by terrestrial facilities; (c) to facilitate the efficient development of this new
resource by removing or neutralizing existing institutional restraints or inhibitions; and (d) to
retain flexibility in our policy making with respect to the use of satellite technology for domestic
communications so as to make such adjustments therein as future experience and circumstances
may dictate." Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238, 1247 (1982),
aff'd sub nom. WOLD Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission. 735
F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
19. Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Competition, 58 R.R.2d
1313, 1326-27 (1985) [hereinafter Competitive Int'l Satellites], appeal docketed sub nom.
International Relay Inc. v. FCC, No. 85-4156 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 1985), appeal docketed sub nora.
Pan American Satellite Corp. v. FCC (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 1985).
20. Id. For a discussion of the regulatory changes to increase competition in the U.S.
domestic telecommunications market and their impact, see NTIA, Issues In Domestic Tele-
communications: Directions for National Policy (July 1985).
21. See, e.g., The Mexico City Earthquake: Another Journalism Test for the Networks,
BROADCASTING 76-80 (Sept. 30, 1985).
22. For a more specific description of satellite use in broadcasting, see A. SCHNAPF,
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR BROADCASTING (NAB 1984).
23. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982). See infra notes 111, 129 and
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allowed the creation of small satellite antennas, or "dishes," affordable for
home use with high-powered satellites to beam television programming
direct to the home or business without the necessity for the "hard wiring"
required for cable-TV systems. This service can provide additional flexibil-
ity in programming as well as much higher quality television reception.24
Although a U.S. priority at the Space WARC was to obtain agreement to
a plan for DBS in the western hemisphere, the services to which the Space
WARC devoted the most time are the "Fixed Satellite Services" (FSS)
which do not include broadcast services. These satellites are used for public
and private telecommunications: overseas telephone and telex, as an
alternative to land lines for rural or inaccessible areas, and for emergency
services when land lines are damaged.25 Additional uses of the FSS are those
by governments for military purposes as well as by INMARSAT for marine
telecommunications.
Business usage of satellites in the FSS has decreased the cost of doing
business for theusers, increasing efficiency, and thereby reducing consumer
prices, in addition to making new services available. Such uses include
teleconferencing, electronic mail and facsimile transfer, private telecom-
munications networks such as those used by the banking, airline and insur-
ance industries, and making nationwide and international print media
available. 26
B. U.S. REGULATORY APPROACH
TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The de minimis U.S. regulatory approach regarding domestic satellites
arose from a conviction that development of new technology services would
be delayed, rather than expedited, by extensive regulation.2 7 A less-
accompanying text (discussion of Space WARC impact upon this service). DBS proposals have
suffered many delays in getting off the ground, the primary problem being financing of the
proposed systems. Japan already has begun experimental use and additional systems are in the
planning stages in France and Ireland. See also The Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS under
FCC and International Regulation, 37 VANDERBILT L. REV. 67 (1984); Anawalt, Direct Televi-
sion Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality, in REGULATION OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL COMMUNICATIONs 361 (1984).
24. High Definition Television (HDTV), for example, is feasible through satellite technol-
ogy. This process produces perceived picture quality equivalent to that of 35 mm. film as shown
in most movie theaters.
25. An example of the latter occurred in connection with the recent earthquake disaster in
Mexico. The first Red Cross team into Mexico City to offer assistance took a portable satellite
dish with them for communications because international telecommunications switches had
been so severely damaged that immediate repair was impossible.
26. Satellite transmissions are used in the publication of USA Today, The Financial Times of
London, and The Economist, among others. See also Note, The Future of Teletext: Legal
Implications of the FCC Deregulation of Electronic Publishing, 70 IOWA L. REV. 709 (1985).
27. It has been suggested that this is the appropriate approach to the use of outer space
generally. See Dula, Private Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW. 159 (1985); see also,
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regulated U.S. telecommunications industry has developed in domestic
communications as well, regarding provision of terminal equipment,28 mul-
tiple and open entry to provide service , 29 resale and shared costs of facilities
and services, 30 establishment of an open entry policy for domestic
satellites,3 ' establishment of private microwave services,3 2 reduction of
FCC oversight of common carrier tariffs and services, 33 and, under court
supervision, the divestiture of American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany's telecommunications monopoly.34
This deregulatory policy recently has been extended to provision of
international telecommunications services generally through several FCC
actions. 35 Formerly, the Commission distinguished between and regulated
differently carriers of voice traffic and record traffic. 36 The FCC has elimi-
nated this dichotomy in that a carrier may now offer either service or both.37
Similarly, the bar which required a company to offer one of these services
either domestically or internationally, but not both, has been eliminated.3 8
Finally, the Commission has proposed applying the same regulatory
framework to international common carriers as it has applied to the U.S.
domestic market.39
OTA, CIVILIAN SPACE STATIONS AND THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE (1985); OTA, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN CIVILIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES (1985).
28. Hush-a-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Customer Interconnec-
tion, 61 F.C.C.2d 766 (1976); Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 240 (1968), recon. denied, 14 F.C.C.2d
571 (1969). See TAYLOR, CURRENT TRENDS IN REGULATION, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: A SOURCEBOOK 104 (1984) [hereinafter TAYLOR].
29. Specialized Common Carrier, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission v. Federal Communications Commission, 513 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir. 1975); DOMSA T 11, 35 F.C.C.2d 844. See TAYLOR, supra note 28. at 104.
30. Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), recon.
denied, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), aff'd sub nom. American Telephone & Telegraph v. Federal
Communications Commission, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978). See
TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 104.
31. DOMSATI, 35 F.C.C.2d 844.
32. Above 890 MHz Report and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959). See TAYLOR, supra note 28, at
104.
33. Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 79-252: Sixth Report & Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985); Fifth Report & Order, 989 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984); Fourth Report &
Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983); Third Report & Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46971 (1983); Second
Report & Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982); First Report & Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
34. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
35. Competitive Int'l Satellites, 58 R.R.2d at 1327-28.
36. See Frieden, International Telecommunications and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 423 (1983) (analysis of FCC deregulation of U.S. carriers
in international traffic).
37. Overseas Communications Services, 92 F.C.C.2d 641 (1982) (TAT-4).
38. Record Carrier Competition Act of 1981, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1982).
39. International Competitive Carriers Policies, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,318 (1985) (Notice of
proposed rulemaking).
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C. U.S. AUTHORIZATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS
U.S. emphasis upon development of a viable international satellite sys-
tem has been evident from the U.S. initial sponsorship of the INTELSAT
system through COMSAT, the U.S. signatory to the INTELSAT agree-
ment and the U.S. representative to INTELSAT. The U.S. regulatory
approach has been consistent in its goal of development of satellite technol-
ogy through an "open skies" policy for domestic satellites. More recently, as
discussed above, this de minimis approach has been extended to domestic
telecommunications generally and to U.S. international telecommunica-
tions links.
INTELSAT, as an independent international cooperative regulated
only by the terms of its "charter," is not subject to U.S. regulation, but
COMSAT, the U.S. representative to INTELSAT, is regulated by the FCC.
INTELSAT has been the monopolist in provision of international telecom-
munications services by satellite, and COMSAT has served as the only U.S.
"link" to this system, giving both the international cooperative satellite
system and the domestic representative to it a monopoly in provision of
these services. Because of COMSAT's monopoly of the INTELSAT "link,"
the FCC has closely regulated its entrance into related fields of business,40 so
that COMSAT cannot use its monopoly power in international satellite
communications to unfairly compete with domestic businesses in other
areas. Earth station ownership for international satellite traffic was also
formerly limited to COMSAT, but the FCC has eliminated this aspect of
COMSAT's monopoly by allowing private ownership. 4 1
The FCC was asked to consider whether, consistent with U.S. obligations
under the treaty establishing INTELSAT and the U.S. policy of support for
the INTELSAT system, it could authorize separate international satellite
systems, thereby depriving both INTELSAT and COMSAT of their respec-
tive monopolies at a stroke.4 2 Consideration of this question required policy
determinations in two areas: first, should the U.S. authorize private interna-
tional satellite system operators, and second, because the U.S. is committed
to the existence of a global satellite system, could the INTELSAT system
withstand competition?
40. Changes in the Corporate Structure and Operations of the Communications Satellite
Corporation, Docket No. 80-634, 97 F.C.C.2d 145 (1984) (Second COMSA TStructure Order);
First COMSAT Structure Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 1159 (1982), recon. denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 701
(1983), aff'd sub nom. RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 758 F.2d 722 (1985); COMSAT Study, supra note 15 at 599-607.
41. Modification of Policy on Ownership and Operation of U.S. Earth Stations that Operate
with the INTELSAT Global Communications Satellite System, 100 F.C.C.2d 250 (1984),
recon. denied, 58 R.R.2d 724 (1985).
42. Application of Orion Satellite Corp. for an International Satellite System, FCC File No.
CSS-83-002-P (1983).
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1. The Domestic Impact
of the New Systems
The first question was the easier one to answer. Authorization of private
international satellite systems would be consistent with the U.S. regulatory
approach in its domestic market to telecommunications in general and to
satellites in specific.
The FCC concluded that granting the new entrants' applications would
benefit the consumer because the type of service they offered would differ
from INTELSAT's.43 Although INTELSAT has entered the same market,
arguably, its design of low-powered satellites requiring expensive earth
stations hinders direct service to customer premises.44 Also, INTELSAT
does not offer efficient "customized" services such as teleconferencing and
high-speed data transmission.4 5
The second question, how these new systems would affect INTELSAT,
was more difficult. This issue has drawn the most attention from policy-
makers, domestic and foreign.
2. The New Systems' Impact
upon INTELSAT
The international response deplored the U.S. policy decision allowing
new entrants as the first step in the demise of the INTELSAT system. It is
feared that separate systems would harm INTELSAT economically and
adversely affect the costs of its services to countries on lesser-used telecom-
munications routes. This concern arises because the tariffs or rates charged
for use of INTELSAT satellites are the same, regardless of the amount of
43. Competitive Int'l Satellites, 58 R.R.2d at 1334-38.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. When Orion filed its initial application, the Executive Branch requested that the FCC
not take any action until a study was made so that the President could make his statutory
determination whether such separate international systems were in the national interest.
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 721(a) (1982). The Senior Interagency
Group on International Communication and Information Policy recommended that the Presi-
dent find that the separate systems are in the national interest and he did so on November 28,
1984. A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems (February 1985) [hereinafter
White Paper], reprinted in International Satellite Issues: The Roles of the Executive Branch and
FCC, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 Int'l Satellite Issues Hearings]. Congress was also intensely interested
in these questions, however. See id.; International Satellite Issues: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (taking testimony on bills regarding COMSAT's
operations and on separate international satellite systems) [hereinafter 1984 Int'l Satellite Issues
Hearings]. Congress has twice expressed its concern that the viability of INTELSAT not be
affected by the new policy, emphasizing U.S. commitment to INTELSAT, and instructed the
Secretary of State to pursue modification of the INTELSAT agreement to permit it to use
cost-based pricing. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L.
No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 236, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985).
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traffic in the geographical area concerned. The transatlantic route is the
most heavily used and generates the majority of INTELSAT's profits,
thereby subsidizing the rates on lesser-used routes. The lesser-used routes
are mostly those affecting developing countries, so this pricing arrangement
reduces their satellite telecommunications costs. It is the transatlantic route
which the separate systems primarily seek to enter.
The necessity of considering the new systems' impact upon INTELSAT
arose not only from the U.S. policy commitment to the INTELSAT sys-
tem, but also from the question of whether authorization of separate in-
ternational systems would be consistent with U.S. obligations under the
INTELSAT treaty. Article 14 requires that an entity proposing to
launch a satellite for international services must coordinate its plans with
INTELSAT to avoid technical interference with the INTELSAT satellite
system. 47 If the proposed service is "specialized telecommunications ser-
vices," then the technical compatibility coordination is all that is required.
But if the new service constitutes "public telecommunications services,"
then, in addition to coordinating for technical compatibility, the new ser-
vice must also coordinate to avoid "significant economic harm" to the
INTELSAT system. 48 Difficulties arise in determining the difference be-
tween "specialized" and "public" telecommunications services and in iden-
tifying the criteria used in determining "significant economic harm."
The State Department Legal Advisor's Office determined that the pro-
posed competitive systems would constitute a "public" telecommunica-
tions service and must, therefore, avoid causing INTELSAT "significant
economic harm." 49 The next difficulty, then, is in determining whether the
separate systems would cause harm to INTELSAT, and what criteria would
be used in making this determination. Although the FCC came to the
conclusion that INTELSAT would not be significantly harmed, its conclu-
sion is not binding upon INTELSAT.
As part of the presidential determination to protect INTELSAT, which
continues to be the keystone of U.S. international communications policy,
the FCC was required to respond to the possibility of harm to INTELSAT
by placing certain limitations on the services that the new entrants could
offer.50 They could provide only "customized" services to private users on a
long-term lease (one-year minimum) or sale basis. 51 These services must not
47. INTELSAT Intergovernmental Agreement, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3853, T.I.A.S. No. 7532
(1971). Any proposed satellite system must be coordinated with other satellite systems already
in place to avoid potential interference. This coordination procedure can be a cumbersome one,
depending upon how many countries are affected, because it is a sequential, bilateral process.
Coordination, therefore, can take years, particularly if INTELSAT is involved.
48. Id.
49. White Paper, supra note 46, at App. B.
50. Competitive Int'l Satellites, 58 R.R.2d at 1398.
51. Id.
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be connected to the public switched network-they may be used only for
private networks outside the public telephone system- 52 and the satellite
operator must enforce these restrictions upon lessees or purchasers by
contract or lose its license to operate the satellite. 53 Finally, of course, the
applicant must await its license to operate until the U.S. has coordinated the
proposed system with INTELSAT for technical compatibility and to avoid
economic harm.
54
The Commission concluded that INTELSAT would not be harmed,
therefore, by the new entrants because they would be only in limited
competition with INTELSAT. INTELSAT's International Business Ser-
vice, the Commission noted, constitutes only a small portion of its
revenues. 55 The Commission's conclusion was that, rather than causing
INTELSAT significant harm, INTELSAT's economic efficiency would im-
prove by forcing it to compete for some of its business.56 To the extent that it
operates more efficiently, its overall rates will decrease. 57 The Commission
also noted that studies of a "worst-case" scenario indicate that any rate
increase would be so small that it could easily be absorbed by its signatories
or INTELSAT itself, so that the developing countries should not be signifi-
cantly affected.58 Furthermore, critics point out, its design policy of relying
upon large and expensive earth stations is more discouraging to the use of its
system by developing countries than licensing of competitive systems.
59
Finally, the U.S. is pursuing other means of ensuring INTELSAT's
continued well-being. It is pressing for changes in INTELSAT pricing pol-
icy to make price more closely related to cost.6° Also, the National Tele-
52. For this reason, the new systems could not be common carriers of telecommunications
services, i.e. one holding out as offering telecommunications services to the public on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Id. A long-term sale or lease of transponder capacity is also viewed by
the FCC as noncommon carrier activity. See FCC Transponder Sales Decision, aff'd, 735 F.2d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. Competitive Int'l Satellites, 58 R.R.2d at 1398. Enforcing this restriction on a user basis
is, however, difficult, as has been learned in the domestic competitive market. The leaky PBX
problem arises when a user, particularly a business user, connects its private PBX into a private
long-distance line, and patches in the long-distance call to the local public switched network. Id.
at 1355-56 n.87. The Commission also prohibited discriminatory procurement by the new
international systems to avoid having a foreign PTT exercise its monopoly leverage by con-
ditioning landing rights upon purchase of equipment from the PTT's country. Id. at 1383.
54. Id. at 1387-90, 1398-400.
55. In fact, in 1984, "72.5% of its total revenues came from international voice service, and
80.8% of its revenues on the transatlantic routes came from voice services. Id. at 1372.
56. Id. at 1376-79.
57. Id. at 1380-81.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1336.
60. See supra note 46 (discussing congressional action). There appears to be some difference
of opinion within the Administration, however, as to whether changes to the INTELSAT
agreement would be necessary to implement a flexible pricing policy. The State Department
takes the position that no changes are needed, while the Commerce Department (NTIA) and
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communications and Information Agency (NTIA) has petitioned the
FCC on behalf of the Executive Branch to allow direct access by carriers to
INTELSAT, bypassing COMSAT. 61 This would eliminate a substantial part
of the costs to the carrier company of using the INTELSAT system, making
INTELSAT more competitive in price with the new international market
entrants.62 It is suggested that eliminating COMSAT's "middleman"
monopoly also would cause COMSAT to become a more efficient competi-
tor, thereby further diversifying the market. 63
D. PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW SYSTEMS
The new market entrants face a host of problems, however, unrelated to
the issue of their effect upon INTELSAT. These include problems of
interconnection with other national systems, current excess supply of satel-
lite capacity, and competition from transoceanic cables for international
traffic.
1. Interconnection Problems
The telecommunications system in the U.S. has been different from that
in most countries. The U.S. market, even at its most regulated in the past,
contained privately-held companies providing telecommunications ser-
vices. These companies were government-regulated by virtue of their
monopoly status but were not government-controlled. Most other coun-
tries, in contrast, have one entity, either fully or partially government-
owned, which runs the post, telephone and telegraph services, generically
known as a "PTT."
Such a system puts the new U.S. competitors at a disadvantage when
dealing with foreign monopolies from whom the right to connect into their
domestic telecommunications systems (landing rights) must be obtained. 4
Their monopoly power gives them the opportunity to play one U.S.-
Congress have concluded that an amendment would be necessary. See 1985 Int'l Satellite
Issues Hearings, supra note 46, at 154-81 (State Dept. views on INTELSAT position paper
and INTELSAT's flexibility to compete); see also Fascell Says U.S. Must Support Flexible
INTELSA T Pricing, Sends Congressional Observer to Assembly of Parties, Communications
Daily, Oct. 8, 1985, at 1-2.
61. Petition for Rulemaking to Consider Authorizing Competitive Access by Carriers and
Users to the INTELSAT Space Segment for the Provision of Customized International Com-
munications Services, Docket No. RM-4904 (Feb. 21, 1985) [hereinafter Direct Access
Petition]. The FCC considered this question previously and concluded that direct access was not
warranted. Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT Space Segment for
the U.S. International Service Carriers, 90 F.C.C.2d 1446 (1982), terminated, 97 F.C.C.2d 296
(1984). At that time, however, INTELSAT's ability to compete in a competitive international
services market was not at issue.
62. Direct Access Petition, supra note 61, at 17-26.
63. Id. at 26-33.
64. See Frieden, supra note 36, at 424-28.
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authorized competitor against another so that the benefits of the U.S.
international competitive policy would accrue to the foreign PTTs rather
than to the U.S. public.6 5 If the new entrants are successful in obtaining
landing rights, then potential exists for the extortion of such monopoly
profits by the PTIs to the detriment of the new entrants and the Commis-
sion's competitive regulatory policies unless the FCC steps in.66
The Commission addressed the conceptual concern resulting from PTT
control over an essential component of the service by stating that "there are
certain measures available to us and the U.S. Government as a whole to
counteract such possible whipsawing." 67 Possible responses include
attaching conditions to the separate system operator's license and requiring
that all operating agreements with foreign PTTs be filed with the U.S.
government for its approval before it will begin consultative procedures on
behalf of the new system.6"
2. Excess Capacity and
Competition Problems
There is also a credibility issue over whether these new entrants are viable
business entities. Presently, there is a glut of unused satellite capacity from
over-estimation of demand. 6 9 This glut will worsen before it improves
because satellite systems will soon face greater competition for international
communications traffic.
65. That is assuming, of course, that the PTTs will negotiate with the U.S. competitors at all.
The PTTs, as a group, are unhappy with what they perceive as the FCC's unilateral rush to
restructure the international telecommunications market. See E. EWARD, THE DEREGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 225-51 (1985).
66. Without FCC intervention, a foreign PTT could "whipsaw" the competing U.S. carriers
by allowing one access to its lines based upon the highest bid received from the carriers, thereby
driving prices up, not down. The Commission has heretofore regulated the record carriers to
prevent "whipsawing" by foreign PTTs and recently proposed extending its regulation to voice
carriers. Implementation and Scope of the Uniform Settlements Policy for Parallel Interna-
tional Communications Routes, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,418 (1985) (Notice of proposed rulemaking).
See E. KWEREL, PROMOTING COMPETITION PIECEMEAL IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(F.C.C. 1984) (discussion of problems inherent to a competitive U.S. international approach
when all other countries maintain monopolistic approaches); G.A.O., FCC NEEDS TO MONITOR
A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET (1983) (report to congressional
committee recommending FCC monitoring of market structure to ensure that FCC actions
have desired effect of increasing competition and benefiting consumers).
67. The Commission engaged in a bit of verbal manipulation in its response to this concern.
It stated that this term "has normally been used in the context of accounting rates and
settlements share for switched services where several U.S. common carriers deal with a single
PTT." Competitive Int'l Satellites, at 58 R.R.2d at 1339. Because the new entrants would offer
only private line-like services which entail no revenue sharing among competing carriers, there
would be no opportunity for "whipsawing." Id.
68. Id. The Commission required that such agreements be filed with it so that it could
monitor the new operators' procurement practices. Id. at 1383. See supra note 53.
69. Colino Urges World PTT's to Market Services More Effectively, BROADCASTING 84-86
(Sept. 30, 1985).
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Transoceanic cables are the alternative technological transmission
method to the INTELSAT system. The FCC has maintained, subsequent to
consultations with European governments, a balance of use between the
INTELSAT system and the transatlantic cables through its "balanced load-
ing" policy. 711 It has required that cable and satellites be used equally in
order to protect INTELSAT's share of the market-the international car-
riers have ownership interests in the cables and would otherwise use them
predominantly-and to protect the public interest in maintaining alternative
communications methods. 7 1 The Commission recently issued new guide-
lines virtually eliminating this policy. 72 Some restrictions remain on AT&T,
but none are applied to other carriers, and these guidelines will be reviewed
in 1988 to determine if they remain necessary at all.73
Aside from the potential loss of some of AT&T's business, the satellite
systems ordinarily would benefit from this change because of technical
advantages over traditional copper-wire cable. Three new fiber-optic cables
have been authorized by the FCC, however, for the transatlantic route and
will be operational within a few years. 74 Fiber optic cables offer similar
advantages of capacity as satellites and may have technical and economic
advantages which will drain some demand from satellite use.
E. INTELSAT's RESPONSE
INTELSAT's response has taken several directions. First, it is consider-
ing new guidelines to replace its former ad hoc method of determining
whether a new system seeking to coordinate with it would cause significant
economic harm to the INTELSAT system.
The INTELSAT Assembly of Parties recently adopted newly-proposed
criteria to be used in this evaluation. Five basic questions would be ad-
dressed in the following order:
Are the services to be offered by the proposed separate systems public
international telecommunications services?
70. Authorization of FCC Facilities to Meet North Atlantic Telecommunications Needs
During the 1985-1995 Period, Docket No. 79-184, 98 F.C.C.2d 1166 (1984) (Third notice of
inquiry) [hereinafter No. Atlantic Facilities].
71. No. Atlantic Facilities, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,050, 19,051 (1985) (Second notice of proposed
rulemaking).
72. No. Atlantic Facilities, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,813 (1985) (report and order).
73. Id.
74. Competitive Int'l Satellites, 58 R.R.2d at 1378-80; Tel-Optik, Ltd., 50 Fed. Reg. 14,761
(1985).
75. These prospects for satellite over-capacity will make financing difficult for the new
entrants to obtain. If they succeed in obtaining financing and do launch, INTELSAT has argued
that they are overestimating the demand for customized services and that, once in position, they
will seek the ability to interconnect with the public switched network, thereby competing
directly with INTELSAT's main enterprise. 1984 Int'l Satellite Issues Hearings, supra note 46,
at 603 (statement of Joel Alper, Pres., World Systems Div., COMSAT).
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" Can the proposed services be provided by INTELSAT?
" Is the proposed separate system likely to prejudice the establishment
of direct telecommunications links through the INTELSAT space
segment among all the participants?
" If INTELSAT is providing or could provide the service, what harm
would be caused to it by the proposed separate system, and how is this
harm evaluated?
" Notwithstanding the above, are there other circumstances such as
transborder satellite services or separate systems providing com-
munications links of relatively short length which need to be taken into
account?
76
The Assembly also passed a new resolution which calls for consideration of
the "cumulative economic harm" which a new system may present to
INTELSAT in light of other systems already in place or proposed.7 7 This
approach would present a tougher standard of harm and was opposed by the
U.S. and other parties who have separate systems planned. 8
Second. INTELSAT has itself considered changing its pricing policies.
The INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, however, tabled consideration of
amending the INTELSAT agreement to allow flexible pricing until its next
meeting in two years, without necessarily foreclosing flexible pricing if it can
be achieved without amending the agreement.7 9 The Assembly also
approved a plan to eliminate some of INTELSAT's excess capacity by
making transponders8 ' available by sale or lease to signatories for their
domestic communications on a non-preemptible basis.8' The new FCC-
authorized entrants have accused INTELSAT of "dumping" transponders
on the market at bargain prices to discourage their market from
developing.8 2
INTELSAT opposes, however, the proposal of "direct access." 8 3 It main-
76. Procedures for Non-Technical Consultations Under Article 14(d), a coordination docu-
ment prepared by INTELSAT staff, as reported in International Communications News 3-4
(Sept. 13, 1985). The U.S. stood alone in its opposition to the adoption of these criteria.
77. INTELSA T Assembly Defers Flexible Pricing, Alters Separate System Coordination,
Communications Daily, Oct. 15, 1985, at 4.
78. Papua New Guinea and the UK also objected. Id.
79. Communications Daily, supra note 77.
80. Transponders operate within a certain bandwidth of frequency to subdivide the band-
width for transmission of individual messages via the same satellite simultaneously.
81. INTELSA T Board Approves Sale/Lease of Transponders, BROADCASTING 88 (Sept. 16,
1985); Communications Daily, supra note 77. INTELSAT has always leased excess capacity to
its signatories for domestic communications use, but heretofore it has been on a preemptible
basis so that, should INTELSAT later need the transponder for its international traffic, it could
bump the domestic user.
82. INTELSAT Out To Sell Excess Capacity, BROADCASTING 35-36 (Aug. 26, 1985);
INTELSAT To Lease Its Excess Capacity, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1985, at El.
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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tains that it was not established to operate as a "commercial" carrier and
does not wish to reorganize in order to do so.
Finally, INTELSAT wields much influence among its constituency. As
the only international communications link for many countries, its existence
as an entity is vital and the costs of its services are of intense interest. Efforts
to protect INTELSAT from new competition surfaced at the Space WARC,
for example, in discussions of coordination procedures.8 4
The separate international systems issue, while not on the formal agenda
for the WARC, was a matter of much discussion in the corridors. The U.S.
policies of introducing more competition into the communications market
have already been criticized as attempts to export deregulation, highlighting
the U.S. approach to communications services versus that of the majority of
other countries. Finally, the demand/supply issue raised in this context is
also pertinent to the WARC allocation discussions: is the presumption of
scarcity of available satellites and spectrum a valid concern?
lI. The 1985 Space WARC
The 1985 WARC has produced a compromise planning mechanism for
allocating telecommunications satellite orbital locations and associated fre-
quencies in the geostationary orbit. The work of the WARC reflects the
increasing intrusion of political pressures into an ostensibly objective, tech-
nical, engineering issue and organization, the ITU.
The ITU, which had its genesis in the post-Napoleonic turmoil of Europe,
is now grappling with the ramifications of space technology.'- The demands
of the Third World for a guaranteed indefinite reservation of orbital slots
and frequencies for possible future use collided with the assurances of the
First World, primarily the U.S., that technology and cooperation could
guarantee their access to the orbit when needed."
A. EQUITABLE ACCESS TO
A LIMITED RESOURCE
Periodically, the ITU convenes administrative conferences on a regional
or global scale to deal with particular issues.8 7 At the previous WARC held
in 1979, new pressures were felt from some of the developing countries
about the utilization of the orbit/spectrum resource. The 1979 WARC, the
84. See text accompanying infra note 124.
85. See CODDING AND RUTKOWSKI, supra note 4.
86. See Emerging Competitive Forces in International Communication (address by Dean
Burch to American Bar Association Annual Meeting, July 8, 1985) Ihereinafter Burch].
87. A conference differs from a plenipotentiary in that it has a specifically-defined agenda
and is limited to that agenda. See CODDING AND RUTKOWSKI, supra note 4, at 59-80. See also
G. CODDING, THE 1982 PLENIPOTENIARY CONFERENCE, INTERMEDIA U-XXXII (1982).
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first general WARC in twenty years, was called to "establish the basic
framework for frequency allocations and radio regulations for the develop-
ment of radiocommunication over the next ten to twenty years." 88 Unlike
previous sessions which had been dominated by the developed nations,
many Third World nations came well prepared to press for a future confer-
ence on use of the geostationary orbit.89
The 1979 WARC passed a resolution recognizing that all countries have
equal rights to the use of the radio frequencies allocated to the geostationary
satellite orbital positions for these services. 90 At the same time, the dele-
gates resolved to convene the International Telecommunications Union
World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary
Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It, or, as it is
more commonly known, the Space WARC, in two sessions: a planning
session in 1985 and an implementation session in 1988. 9 1 The purpose of the
Space WARC was "to guarantee in practice for all countries equitable
access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated
to space services." 92 Heretofore, the ITU has accorded access on a "first
come, first served" basis, which has been described by the chairman of the
U.S. delegation, Dean Burch, as operating in practice as "last come, always
served. ,93
The ITU, at its 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, declared that the radio
frequencies and geostationary satellite orbit are a "limited natural re-
source." 94 The stated concern of developing nations is that Western enter-
prise will turn this limited resource into an increasingly scarce one, that by
the time developing countries were ready to establish their own satellites,
the prime orbital locations and frequencies would have been preempted by
the developed nations. 95 This concern has been heightened by the U.S.
88. Kirby, CCIR and the WARC-79, 45 TELECOM. 468 (1978); see Smith, Space WARC
1985-Legal issues and Implications 114 (unpublished thesis, on file with authors and at
Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 1984).
89. Smith, supra note 88, at 115.
90. ITU, Radio Regulations, Resolution 3 (1982).
91. Id.
92. The 1979 WARC was characterized by a dichotomy in approach. Third World nations
wanted a grant of future rights to nations based on agreed principles, i.e., a priori, while
developed nations preferred to grant rights on a case-by-case basis as each case arose, i.e. a
posteriori. Developed countries attempted to stress equity in access, more multinational
coordination, and establishment of a fixed number of years after which a nation's granted rights
would extinguish. See Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind, March
1980, SATELLITE COM. 22, 23.
93. Burch, supra note 86, at 4. As discussed previously, the newcomer must negotiate
bilaterally with the operator of any existing system which could suffer interference from the
proposed entrant and must pay for any adjustments to accommodate its new satellite system.
94. ITU, International Telecommunication Convention, Final Protocol, Additional Pro-
tocols, Optional Additional Protocol, Resolutions, Recommendations and Opinions, Article
33 (1982).
95. See G. CODDINo, supra note 87, at XVII.
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authorization of additional private satellite systems which, as it has been
perceived, would not only compete for access to this "limited resource" with
countries who would want to have their own satellites in the geostationary
orbit, but would also compete with the INTELSAT system for the com-
munications traffic necessary to maintain the system's viability and the
reduced rates for developing country use of the system made possible by that
traffic volume.
1. "Equitable Access"
The term "equitable access," although much used, has been little defined.
"Equitable" implies fairness, but the term has been used in practice, by
some, as meaning "equal" access. Western nations could accept "equitable
access" as a goal because equity can imply fairness without guaranteeing
equality. Access to the orbit requires, first, obtaining a frequency registra-
tion from the ITU, and second, coordinating the new system with existing
ones, primarily INTELSAT.
The current system favors the status quo; new entrants are obliged to
avoid harmful interference with prior users and thus must "approach the
existing stakeholders and seek such accommodation as they are willing to
provide." 96 Such bilateral negotiations can be complicated and lengthy as
demonstrated by India's and Indonesia's difficulties coordinating their new
satellite systems with existing ones. 97 Representatives of Third World mem-
bers therefore proposed an a priori plan of assignment of slots and frequency
to guarantee their access to this resource. 98
Despite the clamor for a "guarantee" of "equitable access" in the future,
there have been no instances of denial of access under the current system.
No country seeking access to satellite communications, whether through
INTELSAT, regional systems, or for a domestic system, whether for inter-
national or domestic use, has failed to achieve it.
2. "Limited Resource"
The U.S. response has focused upon questioning whether there actually is
a "limited" resource involved. The geostationary orbit and associated fre-
quencies may be limited in physical terms, but the technological progress
made in the past ten years alone indicates that the capacity for use of the
96. Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The ITU in a Changing
World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 307 (1979).
97. India and Indonesia did successfully resolve coordination problems with INTELSAT
and INTERSPUTNIK. See Dizard, Common User Networks: The Hidden Reality, INTER-
MEDIA, May 1985, at 11.
98. ITU Document DT/27-E, Note by the Chairman of Working Group 5 (19 Aug. 1985)
(detailing planning proposals).
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geostationary orbit may be limitless. 99 For this reason, the U.S. has con-
tended that new technological developments would provide an answer to
growing demand for satellite capacity and that inflexible pre-assignment of
the space resource-in some cases decades before a developing nation could
utilize it, if ever-would lock in current technology, retard progress, and
create waste and inefficiency.' 0 Decisions made now would be based on
today's use of the spectrum, the U.S. argued, removing incentive for more
efficient technology in the future. 10 Indeed, even from the standpoint of
physical limitations, the problem of oversupply of transponders looms. As
previously discussed, satellite system capacity currently exceeds demand,
and the new fiber-optic transoceanic cable links will soon provide additional
communications capacity. 102
Given that current demand is being met, both for orbital locations and for
usage of satellites operated by INTELSAT and others, why the concern?
The WARC focused not on market or technical projections, nor upon actual
access to satellite and communications technology, but on national political
prerogatives. The 1985 WARC was influenced not only by the pressures
which built at the 1979 conference for a grant of specific rights to the
orbit/spectrum resource, it reflected growing Third World demands for a
share of resources in general, including, in particular, for potential extrac-
tion of minerals from the sea, 0 3 potential uses of outer space, 1" 4 potential
utilization of Antarctica,10 5 and generalized demands for reform in the
"New World Economic Order," and the "New World Information Or-
der."' 0 6 "A share" of such resources means a re-distribution to developing
nations and an impediment to their full exploitation by developed nations.
At the 1985 WARC, the focus was upon a country's ability to put its own
satellite into orbit, emphasizing the concept of ownership of the satellite, of
national sovereignty, and a "piece" of the orbit. 10 7 This nationalistic view
predominates even as the technology makes national borders less relevant
to communications, especially those transmitted by satellite.' 0 8
99. See Malik, A Provocation: There is No Frequency Shortage, INTERMEDIA, May 1985,
at 24.
100. See U.S., ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS TO WARC ORB (1) REGARDING AGENDA ITEM 2, 1
(June 14, 1985).
101. Burch. supra note 86, at 5.
102. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text; INTELSA TBalking at Opening the Skies
to International Competitors, NAT'L J., May 11, 1985, at 1019.
103. See Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1983, at 155.
104. See infra note 124.
105. See the Antarctic Treaty, done at Washington, D.C.. Dec. 1, 1959, entered into force
for the United States, June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
106. See Rowan and Waite, International Communications Law, Part 1: Maitland Commis-
sion, Economic Development, and the United States, 19 INT'L LAW. 1339, 1343-46 (1985).
107. Colombia, in particular, has advocated the position that countries located beneath a
particular position on the geostationary orbit "own" that position.
108. See Dizard, supra note 97, at 10.
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B. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
In the process of obtaining or assuring equitable access, as demanded by
developing countries, several problems had to be resolved. First, to what
frequency bands would the proposed plan apply?
1. Frequency Bands
The usable portion of the radio spectrum'(9 is divided for various services,
ranging from amateur to broadcast use, from navigation to meteorological
purposes. '"' While Broadcasting Satellite Service, involving proposed ser-
vice by Direct Broadcast Satellite in the Western Hemisphere was discussed
at the 1985 WARC,"'1 the major interest was in various Fixed Satellite
Service frequencies. The affected frequency bands include the C band (6/4
GHz) and the Ku band (11-12/14 GHz). The C band, which is technically
ideal for such communications, accounts for much of satellite communica-
tions traffic; the Ku band is also well suited and is being used increasingly,
and technology is developing to use the Ka band for satellite traffic as
well. 12
The U.S. preferred to limit any allocation scheme to the fewest frequen-
cies possible, preferably in the C band."13 Initially, the U.S. offered to
109. Radio frequency is measured in hertz (hz), cycles per second of electromagnetic
radiation. The usable portion of the radio spectrum is divided into nine bands for telecom-
munications, as follows: 3-30 kHz, 30-300 kHz, 300-3000 kHz, 3-30 MHz, 30-300 MHz,
300-3000 MHz. 3-30 GHz, 30-300 GHz. 300-30010 GHz. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS. RADIo REGULATIONS (GENEVA 1979) AND FINAL PROTOCOL. TREATY Doc. No. 21.97
Cong.. 1st Sess. 49 (1981).
110. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (describing various uses of satellites). The
services as delineated by the ITU are: Amateur Satellite Service, Fixed Satellite Service,
Intersatellite Service. Land Mobile Satellite Service, Maritime Mobile Satellite Service, Mobile
Satellite Service, Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service. Broadcasting Satellite Service,
Radiodetermination Satellite Service, Radionavigation Satellite Service. Maritime Radionav-
igation Satellite Service, Earth Exploration Satellite Service. Meteorological Satellite Service.
See supra notes 20-57 and accompanying text. See Note, Communication Satellites and the
Geostationary Orbit: Reconciling Equitable Access with Efficient Use, 14 LAW & POLY INT'L
Bus. 859, 868 (1982).
1ll. See 1983 Region 2 BSS Conference Decisions Incorporated into the Radio Regulations
at Space WARC. F.C.C. Public Notice (Sept. 18, 1985); supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text.
112. See J. MARTIN, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYsTEMS 138-139 (1978): International
Regulation of Digital Communications Satellite Systems. 32 FED. CoM. L.J. 393, 403-11 (1980).
The frequencies used for Western Hemisphere public communications satellite service include
5.925-6.425 GHz uplink and 3.7-4.2 GHz downlink for the C band; 11.27-12.7; GHz downlink
and 14.0-14.5 GHz uplink for the Ku band; and 17.7-21.2 GHz downlink and 27.5-3 1.0 GHz
uplink for the Ka band. See Rothblatt. Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation. 76 A.
J. INT'L L. 56, 57 (1982).
113. U.S. PROPOSALS OF THlE UNIrED STArES OF AMERICA FOR WARC-ORB(l) (1985): U.S.
ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS TO WARC-ORB(I) REGARDING AGENDA ITEM 2 (1985) (on file with the
authors) [hereinafter U.S. PROPOSALS]. See also Curtain Going Up on Space WARC,
BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 74-75.
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abstain from using one part of the Fixed Satellite Service spectrum, the
so-called "expansion band" which was assigned by the 1979 WARC. The
U.S. said it would not permit use of parts of the fixed satellite service
spectrum (6425-7075 MHz for uplinking and 4500-4800 MHz for downlink-
ing) for domestic service, providing that its other proposals were
accepted. 1"4 This resulted in negotiations over just how much of the spec-
trum would be covered by any new allotment system, with much jockeying
in the final days of the conference.
2. Orbital Time Frame
Second, for how long would these orbital positions be reserved? At
present, procedures can be initiated up to five years prior to launch. Some
delegates talked of reserving slots for fifty years and Algeria argued that in
an a priori plan, "you can see, in writing, the guarantee."''1 5 The U.S.
criticized demands for indefinitely guaranteed reservations in space: "All
we ask is that countries which want to reserve a satellite orbital slot actually
use that slot, rather than let it go to waste or warehouse it in the hope that
they might someday auction it off to the highest bidder. " '1 ' Others pro-
posed varying time periods. The U.S. proposed a voluntary moratorium on
use of the expansion bands by the "industrialized world" for ten years. 117
3. Coordination Process
Finally, what could be done to relieve the current awkward, cumbersome.
and time-consuming coordination process which stimulated this concern for
access? The U.S. proposed regular and frequent, e.g., yearly, multilateral
meetings for purposes of coordinating proposed satellite systems with
affected administrations.'1'8 These regularly-held multilateral meetings
would replace the sequential, bilateral negotiations under the current
system.' "The U.S. proposal also called for sharing the expenses of making
room for new satellite systems in the existing framework, so the new entrant
would not have to pay the entire costs of modifications to existing
systems. 121 This proposal for greater coordination was criticized as protect-
ing existing satellite systems, complicating efforts by newcomers to enter the
orbit. 121
114. U.S. PROPOSALS, supra note 113.
115. See Algeria's Bouhired: Wants Birds in Hand at Space WARC, BROADCASTING, Sept. 9,
1985, at 112.
116. Burch. supra note 86. at 5.




121. See BROADCASTING. supra note 115. at 112.
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4. Planning Alternatives
Various methods of planning were identified to help sort out decisions on
frequency, orbital slots, time frame and coordination process. Five were
identified in a preliminary report to the 1985 WARC: 22
" A long-term /10-20 year) a priori allotment plan with a procedure for
the revision of requirements to accommodate new requirements only if
they do not cause unacceptable interference to those allocated under
the plan;
" A three-to-five-year a priori allotment plan with periodic conferences
to revise the technical parameters and accommodate new require-
ments which do not cause unacceptable interference to those within
the plan;
" A guaranteed access, a priori plan with conferences at ten-year inter-
vals to assure that existing networks and new requirements would be
accommodated;
" A multilateral coordination plan with new procedures for guaranteed
access for new requirements; and
" A revision to the a posteriori, first come-first served bilateral coordina-
tion procedure described as "a phased revision of the existing regula-
tory procedures . . .(simplified to the extent possible) leading to more
efficient use" of the orbit/spectrum resource. 123
C. NATIONALISM AND MULTINATIONAL COORDINATION
As pressures grew for revising the planning and coordination mecha-
nisms, the 1985 WARC grappled with two very different approaches: rigor-
ous planning of resource allocation versus flexible coordination for max-
imum resource utilization. Western nations touted flexibility. Their view
was that regular multilateral coordination would eliminate some of the
problems stimulating the convening of the Space WARC. Such coordina-
tion would likely provide orbital access sooner than a priori assignments,
which only offer future benefits. Third world nations resisted partly because
of feelings of national sovereignty: the belief that a modern nation must
possess its very own communications satellite. This led to demands for
planning procedures providing an absolute guarantee of an orbital position
for it.
The fulfillment of nationalistic objectives runs counter to the spirit of the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which proscribes hindering the development of
the space by declaring it to be "the province of all mankind," which shall be
"free for exploration and use by all States," and which is "not subject to
122. ITU, Provisional Technical Report for WARC--85, CCIR Doc. No. 4/286--E (June 12,
1981) 99-102.
123. Id. at 102. See Smith, supra note 88, at 134.
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national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupa-
tion or by any other means.' 2 4 There is a fine line between access for all
nations, which is well within the spirit of the treaty, and reserved slots for
nations as a form of sovereign property right. Indeed, rather than holding
outer space "in common," the position of some developing countries seems
to be that sharing means that every country gets ownership of a piece of the
resource, whether it is capable of making use of it or not.
Although the U.S. coordination proposals were rejected by Third World
nations which viewed them as protecting the status quo, the WARC pro-
duced a recommendation that changes in the coordination procedures be
considered during the time period before the 1988 session. Other discussion
focused upon with whom satellite systems must be coordinated. The U.S.
opposed the proposal that preference be given in coordination of systems to
Common User Organizations (CUOs), such as INTELSAT and the regional
systems, because such preference could result in complete denial of access to
separate private systems on a practical basis, a result even the developing
countries concerned about future access have not suffered.
The full development of communications technology would be hindered
by any short-sighted allocation scheme which limits long-term efficient use
of the orbit/spectrum resource. Such development would be spurred by the
growth of multinational common user organizations and private entities
competing for market share, instead of locking up resources for potential
use many years in the future. Nevertheless, the WARC produced new
mechanisms to assure member nations "equitable access" to satellite capa-
bility through a type of a priori planning.
D. THE COMPROMISE: AN A PRIORI SYSTEM?
The compromise which emerged in Geneva this past September envisions
an allotment system for the expansion band and a multilateral planning
system for fixed satellite bands. The dual approach envisioned development
of an allotment plan with a duration of "at least ten years," and new
coordinating requirements to ease the cumbersome negotiating process for
new entrants. 125 The allotment system looks very much like the a priori one
demanded by Third World countries. The U.S. pronounced the outcome
more "flexible" than the originally proposed rigid a priori scheme, but
124. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. opened for signature Jan. 27.
1967. 18 U.S.T. 2410. T.I.A.S. No. 6347. 610 U.N.T.S. 205. Arts. I and II. See Rothblatt,
Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation. 58 A. J. INT'L 56, 59 (1982).
125. ITU. FINAL ACTS. WARC-ORB-85 (Geneva. 1985). See WARC 1985: The Politics ol
Space, BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1985, at 56. 57.
WINTER 1986
364 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
expressed reservations to retain its options while final language is being
worked out for the 1988 follow-up session of the WARC.1
26
The compromise would guarantee each nation one slot in the C or Ku
expansion band, although the U.S. reservation pertained to including part
of the Ku band. Allotment was established for 4500-4800 MHz; part of the
6425-7025 MHz band (300 MHz would be selected from this band); and part
of the 10.70-13.25 MHz band (500 MHz would be selected from this band,
specifically from 10.70-10.95 GHz, 11.20-11.45 GHz and 12.75-13.25
GHz). 127
Existing satellite systems were grandfathered, but new multilateral dis-
cussions would be established to work out potential conflicts which would be
created by new systems. Planning would "take into account the require-
ments" of common user organizations like INTELSAT.128 The coordina-
tion procedure should also accommodate unforeseen requirements and
utilize different planning methods for different regions and frequencies in an
effort to assure flexibility.
The U.S. was successful in obtaining agreement to incorporate into the
ITU regulations the allocation plan for direct broadcast satellite transmis-
sions in the western hemisphere. European nations were concerned that
these DBS allocations could create interference across the Atlantic, and the
U.S. convinced them that they would not. 129 This should help expedite DBS
for the United States and persuade financial institutions to back new ven-
tures.
Ill. Conclusions
While Third World countries did not achieve all the guarantees to all the
spectrum they had sought, the emergence of a new planning mechanism
appears certain. The multilateral coordination procedures espoused by the
U.S. represented recognition that the current system of bilateral negotia-
tions can put new entrants at a disadvantage. The first-come, first-served
system with its sequential negotiations leading to ad hoc development of the
orbit/spectrum resource is giving way to a more coordinated methodology to
be finalized in 1988.
At the WARC. a centralized planning approach predominated over a
more market-oriented, pragmatic approach. But will planning produce as
efficient a use of resources as the marketplace might'? While the WARC
126. See Space WARC Reaches Consensus, BROADCASTINc 40 (Sept. 16. 1985).
127. See BROADCASIrNG. sttpra note 125: Delegation Head Burch Hails U.S. Success tt
'Surreal' Space WARC. Communications Daily. Sept. 20. 1985, at 6.
128. Id.
129. See 1983 Region 2 BSS Conference Decisions Incorporated into the Radio Regulations
at Space WARC, F.C.C. public Notice (Sept. 18, 1985).
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reflects member states' perceived national interest in utilizing space, the
technology breaks down national barriers. Moreover, the efficiencies of
communicating via the CUOs and private international satellite systems
may prove more compelling than the establishment of numerous national
systems.
The structure begun in Geneva will not be completed until 1988, when the
Space WARC's second session is scheduled. The U.S. should continue its
efforts to avoid rigid allocation formulae. By 1988 technology and market
forces may have started rendering obsolete even the modest planning
mechanism envisioned in the first session. The advent of fiber optic cables
for transoceanic communications and the projected oversupply of satellite
transponders may render the WARC irrelevant. 130
Space WARC is more than a "tempest in a teapot," however. As consum-
ers of satellite services and as beneficiaries of increased communications
efficiency, lawyers have interests at stake in how the geostationary orbit and
its associated frequencies will be used and whether private enterprise has the
opportunity to introduce competition. As professionals, attorneys' services
will be needed in the wake of technological progress and the new businesses
spawned by it. Increasingly, however, legal services will focus not upon
complying with day-to-day regulation of the communications industry but,
instead, upon developing new regulatory and legal regimes for a new fron-
tier: space. 131
130. The first transoceanic underwater cable capable of transmitting voice service. TAT-I,
provided fewer than 40 two-way voice circuits in 1956. By the 1980s. underwater cables such as
TAT-7 had a capacity of 4000 voice circuits. It is anticipated that the first digital fiber-optic
cable will carry some 12.000 voice circuits, a capacity equivalent to the latest generation of
INTELSAT satellites. TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 110-11.
131. See, e.g., Lack of Law May Slow the Use of Outer Space by Private Enterprise, Wall St.
J., Aug. 20, 1985, at Al.
WINTER 1986

